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Too Much Character, Too Little 
Kultur : Serbian Jeremiads 1994-1995
Marko Živković
Culture without character is, no doubt, something
frivolous, vain, and weak ; but character without
culture is, on the other hand, something raw,
blind, and dangerous.1
1 At the televised July 1994 session of the Serbian Parliament debating the issue of the
control over the regime-run TV, a respected singer of Medieval Serbian spiritual music,
Pavle  Aksentijević,  acting  as  a  member  of  the  largest  opposition  coalition  (DEPOS),
brought a tape recorder to the podium and played a tape of a contemporary Iranian
popular song. Then he played a song by Dragana Mirković  – one of the most popular
female singers of the so-called “turbo-folk” genre. The tunes were practically identical.
He ended his performance by quoting a prominent Yugoslav historian Vladimir Dedijer :
« we Serbs sometimes behave as if we were made [“begotten”] by drunken Turks ».
2 Among the intellectual circles in Serbia, a conspiracy theory had been circulating for
some time that the flood of “turbo-folk” unleashed in the last few years was a cunning
plot devised by “Them” (Milošević, the Socialist Party, the authorities) intended to reduce
the population to utter idiocy2. At one level, then, Aksentijević was accusing the regime of
promoting  an  abominable  genre  of  kitsch,  primitivity  and  unculturedness.  His
performance,  however,  added  the  theme  of  Oriental,  or  more  specifically,  Turkish
taintedness3. He was accusing the establishment of deliberately polluting “Serbdom” with
Oriental tunes, and simultaneously positioning himself and his party as defenders of a
certain kind of pristine Serbian culture.
3 Labels like “culture” could be likened to empty thrones, wrote Edward Sapir : « the rival
pretenders war to death ; the thrones to which they aspire remain splendid in gold »4.
Like Sapir, Aksentijević was advancing the claims of a particular pretender to the empty
throne of culture, and implicit in this move was a claim to cultural supremacy over the
ruling  Socialist  party.  His  performance  was  perhaps  most  significantly  a  claim  to
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authentic nationalism of his own party as opposed to the false nationalism of Milošević5.
Far more than just an argument over the musical taste, this constituted a claim to power.
4 In some other context, this might have been a powerful rhetorical move, but not in the
totally  marginalized  Serbian  Parliament  that  people  almost  universally  considered  a
“circus”. The ruling party held it up to the international community as a proof of its
“democracy”, while the domestic public was treated to a spectacle of opposition’s utter
futility.  And just  like  in  the circus,  the  audience was  laughing at  the  clowns :  while
Aksentijević was playing his tapes, the (in)famous Bidža of the ruling Socialist Party – a
local despot of the Svilajnac municipality and a fat, bald, boar-like incarnation of self-
satisfied vulgarity – was mocking his efforts by making a show of swaying to the music in
the Oriental fashion and clapping his hands with a beatific expression on his face as if to
say – yes, this is exactly the music we, “the people” like the most – thus sending the
populist message to the TV audience : let the pretentious intellectuals rant and rave, we
(the Socialists) are not ashamed of the music that the people obviously love. One social
commentator observed how behavior like Bidža’s serves to impress the people with the
power of the ruling party. The contempt of the opposition and arrogance thus shown, he
argued,  « press  the  right  buttons  with the people  accustomed to  docility  due to  the
proverbial  five  centuries  of  the  “Turkish  Yoke” »6.  Most  importantly,  it  was  the
“uncultured” who were arrogantly showing their contempt towards the “cultured” and
thus, in the perception of the “cultured”, turning the normal scale of values upside down.
5 The sentence with which Aksentijević concluded his performance does much more than
accuse the regime of polluting Serbdom with Oriental kitsch. Deep anguish is coming out
of that statement – it might be construed as saying that we [Serbs] must all be deeply
faulted if we are letting all of this happen : if we are letting Bidža and his likes rule over
us, if we let them ruin us with war and sanctions, and if after all of that we are still
keeping  them in  power.  When  it  comes  to  expressing  such  deep  self-recrimination,
nothing in Serbian repertory of themes could be as powerful as the entangled complex of
the Turkish Taint. Aksentijević was not only making a statement on culture but on the
national character as well. It was as if he was saying : « we are products of violence and
rape ; we were made by the hated Orientals, and not even by the Turks at their best, but
by the drunken Turkish rabble ; thus we are half-breeds, mongrels and bastards, and even
though we utterly resent it, we really are like Turks at their very worst »7.
6 Exactly  at  the  time of  that  Parliament  session,  the Bosnian drama was  reaching yet
another peak. When the Government of Republika Srpska refused to accept the Contact
Group Peace Plan, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) accused it
of « the greatest treason of the Serbian national interest that has ever occurred » and
imposed what then seemed a total blockade upon their brothers across the Drina river. A
major “surrogate”8 of the Milošević regime – Radovan Karadžić – was thus cut loose, and
the media campaign was unleashed with the aim of transforming him from a hero to a
villain, from a noble fighter for the just Serbian cause to a gambler, war profiteer, even a
war criminal.
7 Overnight, the state-run TV changed its tune completely. « Peace has no alternative » was
the new slogan, and for weeks, an endless procession of people, from passers-by on the
streets, to company directors and politicians, parroted it on the TV screen in complete
contradiction to what they were saying only a day before. Yet even though the regime’s
ideological and policy shifts promoted through a succession of “surrogates” had already
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exposed the Serbian public  to a  benumbing number of  cognitive/moral  “warps” this
latest one was arguably the most vertiginous yet.
8 The people remained “docile” as ever, and the oppositional intelligentsia increasingly
turned to laments that shuttled back and forth between « our lack of culture » and « the
faults of our national character ». These “Jeremiads”, as I want to call them, are a variant
of what N. Ries called « litanies and laments » in the context of the post-Soviet Russia9. I
will focus on the period between August of 1994 and August of 1995, because it is in that
period  that  Serbian  Jeremiads  seemed  to  reach  their  “purest”  form  and  became  a
ubiquitous, if not a dominant genre of social commentary that ranged from everyday talk
to discourses of social scientists. Moreover, it is during that period that the Milošević
regime  makes  a  180  degree  turn  that  appropriates,  preempts  and  “colonizes”  the
rhetorics  and  initiatives  of  the  opposition  Jeremiads  by  “simulating”10 their  cultural
criticism. Finally, in contrast to the previous few years of nationalist euphoria, the talk
about  national  character  started  to  focus  increasingly  on  the  flip-side  of  the  heroic
Dinaric type – the fawning servility of the rayah mentality. It is this turn that better
illuminates the whole complex of the Dinaric mentality – the mainstay of discourses on
the national character in Serbia since ethnogeographer Jovan Cvijić first formulated it at
the turn of the century11.
9 If the genre of everyday “sifting of politics” (bistriti politiku) usually relies on conspiracy
theories ranging from local context to vast conspiracies incongruously involving Vatican,
Comintern and the New World Order, the Jeremiads sought the reasons for the present
Serbian predicaments in “deeper” causes having to do with fatal flaws in Serbian culture
and character. Super-charged with a kind of Bakhtinian « internal dialogism », the terms
culture and character tend to accumulate the « taste » of numerous past and present
contexts in which particular social groups imbued them with their « socially significant
world views »12. Thus Serbian Jeremiads of 1994-1995 can offer a valuable insight into the
social tensions and political agendas struggling for supremacy in Milošević’s Serbia.
 
The First Jeremiad : Communist Legacy and the Moral
Breakdown of the Serbian People
10 On August 21, 1994, right after Milošević’s turn from warmongering to peacemongering,
the  popular  TV  show  Impression  of  the  week had  Dragutin  Gostuski,  a  renowned
musicologist and highly respected culture-critic as one of the three guests in the studio.
Asked by the hostess what he remembered as the strongest impression of the previous
week, he launched into a classical Jeremiad underlined by the look of deep depression on
his face, and the leaden tone of his voice punctuated with long sighs and silences of a
deeply  troubled  man  (marked  by  ellipses  in  my  transcription) :  « You  know,  the
impression that I am carrying from this week, from these last weeks, unfortunately is the
same impression that I have been carrying for exactly fifty years ... And that is a heavy
impression ... bad ... the moral breakdown of the Serbian people ...) ». Gostuski’s deep
anguish is obviously occasioned by the latest evidence of how his people easily bend, and
change overnight  what  should have been deep convictions under the pressure of  an
authoritarian regime. For him it bespoke of a tragic lack of moral fiber, of integrity and
backbone.  « For,  you  see,  the  moral  breakdown  is  something  terrible  ...  heavy  ...
something with huge consequences. You could change the political system, you could
regain lost territories, but a loss of morality, that is a thing which affects the human soul
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so deeply, that it could not be rectified even in a hundred years ». And he immediately
associated  this  most  recent  event  with  the  situation  in  1945,  after  the  Communist
takeover. « I was surprised ... by the extent to which our people suddenly changed their
opinion,  under  various  pressures,  to  be  sure,  but  also  often without  any need.  How
treason, cowardice, sycophancy, falsehood, and deceit started to appear, mass joining of
the Communist party by people who never thought they would turn into Communists,
and who calculated it to be a good move bringing some social privileges and a better life
...  ». Such lack of backbone does not agree with the entrenched self-image of Serbs as
heroic, independent, and proud people and Gostuski now starts to doubt even the most
hallowed instances of Serbian heroism. « ... I wondered how could a people who makes so
much of its heroism, its courage and honor, who proved through history ... I started to
doubt, I am telling you sincerely, I started to doubt even the Kosovo battle, even the
Salonika front, and all these heroic and honorable deeds of the Serbian people and I asked
myself  how could something like this happen ... ».  And he offers a quite wide-spread
thesis as an explanation :
I pretty much tend towards a thesis, supported in particular by our writer Danko
Popović, that the Serbian people has not, in fact, recovered ... biologically ... from
its losses in wars. Terrible losses in the First World War and in the Balkan War ...
and  then  it  was  (sigh)  ...  finished  in  this  war  ...  when  it  happened  that  ...  as
everybody knows, in the war only the bravest, that is to say, also the most
honorable men get killed. (...) So that, it is not too far fetched to conclude that with
this damage we have become, in the majority, a genetic trash, because those who
remained were mostly  deserters  and dodgers,  and people of  bad character,  and
that, of course, through generations has been reproduced.
11 Two significant  threads could be followed from Gostuski’s  statements.  The first  is  to
blame fifty years of Communism for having broken the moral backbone of Serbs. This is a
complaint often made, and it is probably familiar in most post-communist societies. A
prominent  writer  and  social  commentator,  Milovan  Danojlić,  however,  offered  a
penetrating  analysis  of  how Tito’s  special  brand of  Communism,  with  its  anti-Soviet
rhetorics,  open borders,  seeming freedoms and a higher living standard,  might  have
corrupted the Yugoslavs in a way even more devious and sinister than the Soviet type of
real socialism : « we lived in bearable evil », he wrote, « it devastates the soul worse than
tyranny »13. But if fifty years of Communism had broken the Serbian moral backbone, a
further question can be asked of why did the Serbs succumb to Communism in the first
place, and why are they still supporting another neo-communist one – Milošević’s. While
Gostuski  and  Danko  Popović  adhere  to  the  popular  thesis  of  genetic  thinning  out,
especially after the turn of 1994, the answer to that question came to be increasingly
sought in the proverbial five centuries of Ottoman rule. As an aphorism put it :  « the
Communist didn’t pick the Serbs for nothing. Five centuries under the Turks are our best
recommendation »14.
12 « On our soil, after many centuries of slavery under the Turkish yoke and after many
decades of communist rule », writes an expert on ethnopsychology, Žarko Trebješanin, 
a  special  type  of  authoritarian-submissive  personality developed  as  one  possible
human response to brutal, inhuman living conditions. The authoritarian-submissive
personality system represents a specific hybrid of authoritarian consciousness and
“rayah mentality” (Cvijić),  characterized by :  worship of authorities,  pragmatism,
egoism, submissiveness, servility, resentment, and moral mimicry15.
13 The rayah mentality, seen as the flip side of the heroic Dinaric ethos is often localized, and
ascribed to particular groups « ...  it  is  characteristic of the middle and especially the
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southern part of the Balkans (Southern Serbia, Macedonia, Bulgaria) », writes another
expert in ethnopsychology, Bojan Jovanović,  « while the Dinaric type is related to the
western and southwestern Serbian ethnic  area »16.  The « Violent  Dinaric  Type »,  first
formulated  by  the  ethnogeographer  Cvijić,  is  most  commonly  associated  with  the
« highlanders »  of  Montenegro,  Herzegovina,  Croatian  and  Bosnian  Krajina.  These
highlanders  are  then often collectively  referred to as  “Serbs”  (Srbi)  in  opposition to
“Serbians”  (Srbijanci)  –  meaning  the  Serbs  from  Serbia  proper.  The  highlanders  are
associated with tribalism, epic ethos, and the gusle, which makes it easy to decipher to
whom Danko Popović refers when he writes that the peasants from Morava – one of the
proverbial “heartlands of Serbia”, « are afraid of the fanaticized national politics and its
rhetorics which is good for the gusle, but not for historical practice »17.
14 Danko Popović, already mentioned by Gostuski, is certainly one of the most influential
recent  exponents  of  the  thesis  that  pits  impetuosity,  irrational  extremism,  and
nationalistic  fanaticism  of  the  highlander  Dinarics  against  the  sobriety,  wisdom,
pragmatism and peacefulness of the Šumadija domačin (household head), Morava peasant,
or simply level-headed, hard-working solid “Serbians”.
15 Both  the  lowlander  and  highlander  mentality  could  be  given  a  whole  spectrum  of
variously shaded valuations : lowlanders could be seen as rational, pragmatic, cultivated,
on the one hand, or degenerate, soft, submissive – the embodiment of rayah mentality, on
the other. Similarly, the highlanders could be seen as brave, proud, of superior mettle, or
obversely, as violent, primitive, or arrogant.
16 If the sober, peace-loving lowlander Serbians are lamenting what they see as domination
by their megalomaniac,  impetuous,  guslar highlander brethren from across the Drina
river, it is only to be expected that the latter might have a different view of the situation.
In 1991, the influential Belgrade weekly NIN was running a series of essays titled : « The
Dinarics and the Serbians » (Dinarci i Srbijanci). The fifth installment of May 17, features
Nikola Koljević, a professor of English literature at the University of Sarajevo and later
one of the top leaders of Republika Srpska. He accuses NIN (as a newly “liberated” seat of
urban liberal opposition18), of discrimination against the Dinarics. They got the worst deal
in  NIN's  « anthropogeographical  meditations »  on  « who  is  who »  in  Serbia,  Koljević
writes sarcastically,
First because they were the ones who refused to be cast in chains preferring instead
to be in a centuries long mountain hideaway, guilty because they settled the more
fertile and richer regions. Guilty of thinking that Serbia is a free country for the
Serbs born outside of it as well.
Their other, and much graver sin is that ... they have taken over many respectable
and influential  positions.  They  have  established  their  own networks  ...  and  the
Belgrade lobby simply cannot stand that any more.
Neither is  it  “civilizationally” correct.  How could it  be when, since the times of
Cvijić, it is well known that those are one and all violent types who are poisoning
the agrarian tender souls with their aggressive visions of Serbian unity and concern
for the brothers in other Serbian regions.
17 This diatribe is full of allusions that might be profitably unpacked in some other context,
but  suffice  it  to  notice  here  how the  « agrarian  tender  souls »  are  put  in  the  same
category  with  “decadent”  Belgrade  elite  luxuriating in  fine  distinctions,  high  falutin
democratic principles and neurotic individualism at the time when the great danger to
the nation as a whole necessitates the highlanders’ superior mettle and sense of national
mission.
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18 Koljević  here  turns  the  tables  on  the  Belgrade  opposition  circles  who claim a  long-
standing  anti-communist  and  bourgeois19 pedigree.  These  circles  are  very  fond  of
pointing  out  how  the  new  Communist  elite  which  flooded  Serbia  after  the  WW  II,
disinherited the old bourgeois elite and purged them physically,  was overwhelmingly
composed  of  the  highlander  Dinarics  from  outside  of  Serbia  proper.  Now  here’s  a
response  from  the  viewpoint  of  « agrarian  tender  souls »,  comming  from  Nikola  J.
Novaković, a lawyer from Novi Sad, and secretary of the local Rotary Club :
Our Djole Nacionale20 is wrong when he says that Novi Sad is peasantified (poseljačen
). If only we were that lucky ! Our peasants lean on the Fruška gora21 with their feet
in  the  Danube,  and  they  see  to  the  ends  of  Europe.  Those  others  [highlander
newcomers] do not have the breadth [of view] and do not know how to look. When
you show them the horizon of our flat land they say : “You are fucking with me,
can’t you see that nothing could be seen !” These people are used to the near and to
see nothing but the mountains up to their noses, only the sky, vertically ... Some
hard people and harsh. [They] holler and snarl, swallow vowels or twist them. They
proclaimed force  and power  for  justice,  deception  and  corruption  for  morality,
malice and envy for customs, Asiatic howling for music, and pistols and revolvers
for national costume ... Comrades22, here we celebrate others’ successes and we pay
for our own drink. This is the essential difference between the comrades and the
gentlemen (gospoda). I am not losing hope that you will understand the importance
of good manners and home upbringing23.
19 Not having mountains to block his view, the Vojvodina lowlander peasant can see to the
ends of Europe, he is thus allied with it, as with civilization and culture. In Novaković’s
view, he is a kind of peasant-cosmopolitan24. And for all the bitterness the natives feel for
newcomers, according to the saying : « came the wild, kicked out the tame » (došli divlji,
oterali pitome), Novaković believes that the “wild” will eventually be tamed.
20 Depending of who is talking to whom, when, under what circumstances, and for what
purpose,  the  permutations  and  combinations,  sometimes  seemingly  logically
inconsistent, of these ethnopsychological distinctions can assume dizzying complexity.
The tokens of highlander or lowlander mentality could be pinned on different regions,
and different groups of people in order to « exalt or debase identities » in the « quality
space »25. They could be and often are used in the way Gal calls “recursive”, as shifters, or
fractally in the sense that the labeling tends to get reproduced on ever smaller scales26.
Moreover, the rival groups (in particular the “Serbs” and “Serbians”) tend to analyze the
supposed  Communist  mentality  (a  negative  characteristic  in  most  oppositionary
rhetorics) of their opponents in terms of their highlander or lowlander traits.
21 These character types, however, are often used without geographic localization in order
to talk about the general Serbian character. In that sense, the Dinaric character and Rayah
mentality could be seen not as characterizing different populations, but as being two
sides of  the same coin,  or two phases of  the same character structure,  in a way,  for
instance,  that  mania  and depression could  be  just  different  phases  of  the  maniacal-
depressive disorder. The analogy is not spurious, for psychiatric diagnoses of the national
character became a prominent type of stories Serbs told themselves about themselves in
the last few years.
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The Second Serbian Jeremiad : Is Homo Balcanicus
(still) a Homo Heroicus, or just an Adolescent
Braggart ?
22 At  the  book  promotion  of  literary  critic  Petar  Džadžić’s  two  volume  work  on
ethnopsychological  themes27 (June  6,  1995)  an  eminent  Jungian  psychiatrist,  Vladeta
Jerotić28, compared the Balkan Dinaric type with an average adolescent :
Inclined to strong imagination, his emotional life at odds with thinking, at times
omnipotent ... at times dejected, as if he’s lost everything, the Balkan Dinaric does
not  judge  reality  well  precisely  because  of  these  traits  of  temperament  and
character. ... It is impossible not to notice a similarity between the behavior of the
Serbian Dinaric and the behavior of an average adolescent.
23 Here  the  national  character  embraces  both  the  rayah moral  mimicry  and  the
megalomaniac  Dinaric  heroism united in  a  Balkan “homo duplex”.  To liken national
character to that of an adolescent is like comparing those lacking culture or civilization
with children, lunatics, women, and with nature. In that sense Jerotić’s judgment would
put the Serbs somewhere in-between – as an adolescent is half-way between the child and
the adult, so is the Balkan man half-way between barbarity and civilization, nature and
culture,  tradition and modernity,  raw and cooked.  Indeed,  one might say,  he is  half-
baked,  neither  here  nor  there,  he  needs  finishing,  polishing,  refinement,  maturing,
cultivation. As Arnold had put it : « ... character without culture is something raw, blind,
and dangerous ».
24 There  was  a  general  feeling  at  that  book  promotion,  certainly  reinforced  by  recent
events,  that  something  essential  and  very  important  is  lacking  from  the  national
character.  It  was Ratko Božović,  a  sociologist  of  culture and prominent culture-critic
(himself  of  Dinaric  descent)  who  explicitly  talked  about  that  lack,  as  the  lack  of  a
“cultural  model”  (kulturni  obrazac)  by  invoking  a  famous  essay  on  Serbian  national
character by Slobodan Jovanović,  one of the most influential intellectual and political
figures in recent Serbian history.
25 Serbs have developed both the political and the national models, Jovanović was saying,
but they lack a cultural one. He was talking about culture in the sense of self-perfection of
the individual, the harmonious and comprehensive development of the person, that is to
say in the sense of bildung. What he had in mind was a cultural model concerned not with
« perfecting  the  social  institutions,  but  with  cultivating  the  individual,  such  as,  for
example, the “model built by the old humanists on the basis of ancient philosophy”, or
the  English  “gentleman”,  the  German  “cultured  man”,  and  the  French  “honnête
homme” »29. The cultural model is, however, developed by the older, or more fortunate
nations, rather than the individuals, and should be emulated by the nations that lack it.
26 “Culture”, that refinement that we need in order to rectify our half-baked or « raw, blind
and dangerous » character has to be imported from places that have already developed it,
and models, are, as L. Greenfeld would say30, by definition superior to model imitators.
Emulation brings resentment and attempts to transform one’s faults into virtues, and
other’s virtues into vices. Thus our (German) Kultur, or our (Russian) Soul is superior to
your (French) civilization, or your (Anglo-Saxon) soulless mercantilism.
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27 Some  among  the  Serbian  elites,  like  Slobodan  Jovanović,  wholeheartedly  embraced
imported Western models. Those, however, who resented them have shown two types of
analytically distinguishable responses : one that lays claim to the Byzantine High Culture
heritage  of  the  Serbs  presented  in  its positive  valence,  as  a  civilization  and culture
superior to that of the West (in the West, of course, the very word “Byzantine” carries all
kinds of  Orientalist  taints) ;  the other extols the native “barbarogenius” – the innate
superiority over the West of the Serbian peasant Volkgeist. In practice, the two are mostly
amalgamated and mixed in various proportions and permutations, but sometimes they
come to be distinguished and even opposed to each other31.
28 Both Božović and Jovanović, constantly conflated several important senses of the term
“culture”. One is “culture” as bildung, – personal refinement and perfection. Another is
“culture” as a marker of social “distinction” in Bourdieu’s sense. In yet another sense,
“culture” stands for the collective, national genius in its various guises. The story of how
Kultur as a weapon of inter-class distinction in Germany was transformed into the inter-
national distinction between French civilization and German Kultur is one of the founding
stories of modernity32, and the two axes of comparison have been conflated ever since.
Once  nationalised,  culture  became  democratized,  then  massified,  and  mechanically
reproduced thus causing the cultural angst of a new breed of cultural critics from Simmel,
through  Benjamin  to  Sapir  and  Adorno.  Through  all  these  historical  accretions,  the
notion of  “culture” assumed the polyvalent  richness that  made it  into an extremely
potent  multi-purpose  weapon  in  all  kinds  of  social  struggles.  It  became  heavily
contentious  and  emotion-laden.  When  I  approached  Ratko  Božović  after  the  book
promotion and asked him what exactly did he mean by “cultural model”,  he became
highly agitated and almost shouted at me : « what do I mean ? What do you mean I mean
by culture ? – sensibility,  intellectuality,  morality ...  sense of responsibility ! » « that’s
what we lack ! ». And then with a pained expression of revulsion mixed with indulgence
towards the character flaws of his own people he abruptly turned and left.
29 We might lack culture as something that would tame, polish and complete our unruly
character, the panelists were all saying, but they probably didn’t mean that the whole of
the nation equally suffers from « too much character and too little Kultur » ; not all Serbs
lack culture, and those who actually do have it, should reform, educate and cultivate, that
is  to  say,  lead  those  who  do  not.  The  “cultured”,  however,  were  not  leading  the
“uncultured”  in  Milošević’s  Serbia.  As  another  Jeremiad  had  put  it,  « the  wise  got
silenced,  the  fools  climbed  into  the  saddle,  and  the  rabble  got  rich ».  The  Serbian
Jeremiads of mid-nineties were comming from marginalized intellectual elites, ignored,
or at most used as disposable “surrogates” by the regime.
 
Culture as Self-Defense of Society and Personality :
The Riders of the Cultural Apocalypse
30 Some  three  months  before  that  book  promotion,  the  marginalized  and  besieged
oppositional intelligentsia gathered for a conference titled Culture as Self-Defense of Society
and Personality33,  where for two days they engaged in agonized denunciations of what
Ratko Božović, who again was one of participants, termed « the Riders of the Cultural
Apocalypse » :
It is noticeable that in the capital city there is no more middle stratum. It plunged
into the chasm of poverty. There’s no possibility that it can reproduce any elite. The
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elite is now determined by wealth and property, not by spiritual superiority. And
without  the  elite  of  spirit  and  of  knowledge  there  is  no  entrance  into  the  21st
century.
From the half-world of the [criminal] underground, from the provincial suburbs,
from the twilight of metropolis, from the hell of war – there emerged the riders of
the  cultural  apocalypse.  More  precisely :  the  white  collar  criminals,  the  hard
currency  rentiers,  the  war  profiteers  and  the  dangerous,  criminal  types  –  the
mafiosi. More or less everything that was objectionable in spiritual and moral terms
appeared  at  the  very  center  of  the  degraded  reality.  Like  some  formless  and
terrifying shadows, the new primitives accompany the times of crisis, anxiety, fear
and emptiness.  There,  one can begin the story of their spiritual  poverty,  of  the
nature  of  their  raw  strength  which  is  far  from  either  culture  or  cultivation,
removed both from emancipation and education. One could actually end that story
on the note about the vitality of primitivism, bolstered by the zurle i talambaši34 of
the newly composed (novokomponovana)  culture were it  not for the fact that the
folkloric spirit and the neorural primitivity have nested in the urban environments
as well. Our aesthetician Dragutin Gostuski was surprised by the extent to which
the scale of values had been degraded, and especially by the tendency of the urban
youth to fall into the embrace of primitive and Islamicized music and abandon the
“international pop sphere”.
It makes almost no sense to discuss the easily recognizable “axiology” of the world
that feels at home in the junkyard of kitsch. The nouveau riche take all  that life
offers, all they can grab ... These fishers in troubled water (mutnolovci) – foreigners
to intellectuality, sensibility and morality, and very close to the aesthetic of kitsch –
achieved  the  strategy  of  winning  important  positions  in  the  society...
Immoderation, bad taste, grandomania and arrogance are marks of their life style.
A style without style. The refinement of the newly composed rich is laughable and
caricatural. Full pockets, empty souls.
31 It is clear that, in Bourdieuan terms, Božović is here engaging in a classification struggle,
a  game  of  cultural  one-upmanship  predisposed,  like  all  talk  of  art  and  cultural
consumption,  « to  fulfill  a  social  function  of  legitimating  social  difference »35.  He  is
certainly trying to put himself in the place of « cultural nobility » by denouncing the
« undifferentiated  hordes  indifferent  to  difference »36.  The  impression  one  gets  from
reading Bourdieu is of an almost crystalline structure of minute distinctions within which
is waged a lively but highly ordered classification struggle. No sense there that every so
often come catastrophe totally erases these distinctions and the very classes engaged in
the struggle.
32 Even though engaged in the distinction game in its fundamental logic similar to the one
Bourdieu uncovers in France,  the Serbian intellectuals,  however,  often view the very
structuration,  that  is,  the  differentiation  and  hierarchization  of  their  society  as
something very recent, undeveloped and precarious37. It is moreover, subject to tragically
frequent disasters that level the painstakingly built differentiation or completely reverse
it when, according to the above mentioned formula, « the wise get silenced, the fools
climb into the saddle, and the rabble gets rich ».
33 This is what Božović points to when he talks about the middle class being plunged into
the chasm of poverty and unable to produce the social elite. Perhaps the clearest and
most  succinct  statement  of  this  problem  comes  from  another  participant  in  the
Conference, the urban sociologist Sreten Vujović, and it is worth quoting at some length :
Urban  development  and  the  bourgeoisie  have  been  experiencing  tragic
discontinuities  in  our  regions38,  the  bourgeoisie  had  been  few,  short  lived,  and
powerless, and to this day has not been able to impose itself as an agent of any kind
of significant social change.
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In our society,  as a distant province and a semi-colony of the Ottoman Oriental
despoty,  the  bourgeoisie  and  enterpreneurship,  as  the  carriers  of  the  liberal
orientation, could not have developed and entrenched themselves properly.  The
social structure didn't change much even after the “peasant-bourgeois” revolution
39.  Instead  of  the  bourgeoisie  (gradjanstvo)  the  ruling  stratum  was  the  trading
bourgeoisie of peasant origin whose cultural-ethical and political value orientations
were  not  a  milieu  particularly  advantageous  for  the  economic  and  political
modernization. In the whirlwinds of the Balkan, the First and the Second World
wars, as well as in the first years after the Second World War, the already scarce
bourgeoisie was significantly reduced in number. Oriented towards the autocratic
state and very much dependent on it, the thin stratum of the bourgeoisie mostly
did not incline towards liberal ideas. The dissident, that is to say, the oppositionary
groups  which  were  more  or  less  publicly  active  after  1945,  were  most  often  of
Marxist  orientation,  and  that  meant  they  were  either  against  or  ambivalent
towards the bourgeoisie.
34 In a word, at the time of the uprisings, which is the time of its “birth”, the Serbian society
starts out as a remarkably “flat”, undifferentiated society composed of peasants only, and
in  the  next  200  years  whatever  social  differentiation  develops  it  gets  repeatedly
« flattened » again in a series of wars and other catastrophes. This, according to Latinka
Perović40, is the social foundation for what she claims is the most enduring and influential
Serbian ideology that could be summarized in the saying : « I don't care how little I have
as long as my neighbor doesn’t have too much more », that is, the ideology of the lowest
common denominator,  egalitarianism in poverty,  anti-liberalism,  anti-capitalism,  in a
word, anti-differentiation.
35 Those who aspire to cultural nobility have always denounced the parvenus, the arrivistes,
the nouveau riche, or the philistines in more or less the same terms Božović uses – for
their “raw strength” bereft of “culture or cultivation”, for their “spiritual poverty”, their
“immoderation”, “bad taste”, “arrogance”, or “empty souls”. What makes a Jeremiad like
his, and the chorus of Jeremiads heard at the Conference so rich and revealing are the
particular local twists on the generic themes.
36 It is very important to notice that in the Serbian version it is not the “peasants” who are
the  « Riders  of  the  Cultural  Apocalypse ».  If  the  urban  elite,  which  in  Serbia
overwhelmingly descended directly from the peasantry, acquired “culture” in the sense
of “urbanity”, “education”, “refinement”, and bildung, the “peasants” were supposed to
embody “culture”  as  the  repository of  the  national  genius,  as  Volksgeist.  It  was  thus
extremely difficult for the elite to denounce the “peasantry” as lacking culture because
that  would  contradict  their  traditional  position  as  spokesmen,  if  not  wholesale
“inventors” of the Volksgeist embodied by the idealized peasantry.
37 In a “flat” society based on the ideology of egalitarianism, moreover, elitism that would
stray too much from the common run was always suspect, resented and frequently even
forcibly supressed. « Even in the most elite institutions », writes Stojan Cerović, « there
was always squatting in some corner a feeling of inauthenticity,  the guilt  for raising
above the people and for emulating the outside world. That’s why a powerful category of
domestic  intellectuals  loves  to  invoke the authority  of  their  peasants  and to remind
everybody to heed that source of wisdom »41.
38 If then the authentic “peasant” is idealized and beyond critique, the odium falls on the
inauthentic peasant, the one who abandoned that pristine condition, and lost the volkgeist
authenticity  without  acquiring  the  “cultural  model”  of  the  urbanite  cosmopolitan
instead. He42 is the peasant-urbanite, the half-breed, the eternal semi-.
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39 Practically all of the Jeremiads on our abysmal cultural conditions abound with images
that suggest the state of being somehow half-,  or semi-,  unfinished, neither here nor
there, in transition, in-between, and so on. Božović talks about the “half-world” (polusvet)
of the criminal underground, about “suburbs” (predgradje ; suggests a zone of neither
country  nor  city  proper,  thus  a  liminal,  in-between,  transitional  zone  of  peasant-
urbanites), and about the “twilight” of the metropolis. By mentioning the « fishermen in
troubled water » (mutnolovci), he invokes an influential 1938 essay by V. Velmar-Janković
on  the  “Belgrade  man”  that  centers  on  the  phenomenon  of  “transitionality”  (
prelaznicarstvo)43, and by mentioning « intellectuality, sensibility and morality » (lacking
in the mutnolovci),  he is  invoking the famous essay on Serbian national  character by
Slobodan Jovanović, which again talks about the “semi-intellectual” (poluintelektualac) as a
phenomenon linked to our lack of “cultural model”.
40 In one or the other if its guises, it is obvious that the peasant urbanite is the « rider of
cultural apocalypse » denounced in the cultural Jeremiads. As an in-between figure, « a
hybrid class half-way between village and city », however, he often comes to stand for a
number  of  other  in-between,  half-baked,  neither-here-nor-there  positions :  between
bildung and  Volksgeist,  between  tradition  and  modernity,  provincialism  and
cosmopolitanism,  between  Turkey  and  Germany,  Ottoman  Empire  and  Byzantium,
Balkans and Europe, East and West... The Peasant Urbanite thus comes to stand for the
whole of the present-day Serbian society rather than just for its uncultured stratum.
According to what is  perhaps the ur-text  of  this  whole genre of  discourse44,  his  is  a
culture of the “tribe in agony”, his world view that of a small town (palanka) seen as some
sort  of  abysmal  Purgatory-like  twilight  zone between the village  (tradition)  and city
(modernity) where Serbs as a whole seem to have gotten stuck for good45.
 
It’s Nicer With Culture : Or How a Smiling Mesolithic
Figurine Swallowed Oppositional Discourse on Culture
41 Whatever their position was, however, with Milošević’s great turn in August of 1994, the
oppositional Jeremiads suddenly found their own agendas and rhetorics appropriated by
the  very  regime  they  accused  of  promoting  the  various  « Riders  of  the  Cultural
Apocalypse ». « Battle against newly-composed kitsch and chaos in culture », reports Naša
Borba on September 22, 1994, « this is the motto upon which the program and the future
endeavors of the Serbian Ministry of Culture are based, announced by the minister of
culture Nada Popović-Perišić yesterday at the press conference in Hayat ».
42 In the socrealist campaign similar to the one launched 23 years before at the “Congress of
Cultural Action” in Kragujevac, the Ministry of Culture mounted an offensive against the
« tide of all that is ugly and low, present not only on the radio and television waves, but in
everyday life, behavior, speech, morals and the appearance of the city »46 couched in the
rhetoric hardly any different from the rhetoric used by the oppositional Jeremiads. By
that move, the regime, through its Ministry of Culture, “colonized” the initiatives of the
marginalized oppositionary culture critics and “simulated” their crusade against the very
phenomena they strongly associated with the regime itself.
43 The  whole  campaign  was  seen  by  most  oppositional  intellectuals  as  insincere  and
vacuous, if not outright cynical : « how could she, poor soul », writes M. Glišić about Nada
Popović-Perišić, « how could she strangle turbo-folk, when the PMs from her own party
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are singing to these very tunes in the Serbian Parliament ! »47 (And we know who that
Socialist Party PM was – none other than Bidža of Svilajnac).
44 The opposition might have protested the insincerity and vacuosness of the campaign, but
it couldn’t prevent their own rhetorics and steam being stolen by the center which called
all the shots, just like the peace initiatives and rhetorics of several parties and groups
vehemently opposed to the war from the start were stolen, or appropriated by Milošević’s
« peace has no alternative » campaign.
45 The Ministry of Culture next moved from simulating the critique of unculturedness to a
wholesale colonization of « what kind of a good thing culture is » by proclaiming 1995 – a
Year of Culture, and launching an ostentatious PR campaign under the motto : « it’s nicer
with culture » (Lepše je sa kulturom). The Belgrade affiliate of Saatchi & Saatchi was paid a
large undisclosed sum to produce posters, videos, flags, stickers and badges in the glittery
Western  marketing  style.  Thus  an  endeavor  clearly  reminiscent  of  old  communist
campaigns to « culturally uplift the masses » (kulturno uzdizanje masa) was couched in a
form that suggested the opposite – free-market capitalism. “Culture” was treated like any
other product to be advertised : « when we work on coffee, some cream, or cookies, it’s
the same procedure », a member of the Saatchi & Saatchi “creative team” explained, « we
decided  not  to  talk  against  kitsch,  but  for  culture  ...  to  try  to  make  culture  more
interesting ... more familiar to our audience, so that in the market competition between
the one and the other (kitsch and culture) we somehow win ».
46 The campaign covered just about every possible aspect of culture : the emblem of the
campaign was a well know Mesolithic figurine from Lepenski vir – therefore culture in
this area is thousands of years old (never mind that the Lepenski vir culture had nothing
to do with Serbs)48 ; the figure wears a tie – hence the culture of dressing ; holds a spoon
and knife – hence the culture of eating, that is to say, good manners, and so on. The
customary objects and institutions of high culture were heavily represented in their most
generic form, but so were the objects of the established pop-culture such as the Levi’s
jeans, or Coca-Cola. Nor were the emblems of national culture neglected. There is a video
clip that  shows almost  all  the icons of  national  culture in their  chronological  order,
starting  with  archeological  finds  of  Neolithic,  Celtic  and  Roman  times,  through  the
medieval  Serbian  monasteries,  images  associated  with  the  19th century  romantic
nationalism,  and  ending  with  fashionable  Paris-based  painters.  Practically  all  of  the
senses of the term “culture” were covered :  culture as manners,  culture as tolerance,
culture  as  objects  of  high  culture,  culture  as  long  standing  tradition,  culture  as
expressions of  national  genius in all  of  its  forms,  the High Byzantine embodied in a
famous fresco, as well as the populist, Romantic Volksgeist type embodied in the familiar
portrait of Vuk Karadžić.
 
Conclusion
47 In the culture wars of the past several years in Serbia, the various groups that are kept
away from the center of power were trying to promote their pretenders to the throne of
culture and themselves as a legitimate cultured class entitled to its share of power. They
all had to come out and say what kind of a good thing they consider culture to be, and
what kind of a bad thing “unculture” (nekultura) is. The center of power, however, didn’t
need to  define anything.  The regime just  proclaimed that  « it’s  nicer  with culture »,
something nobody could disagree  with.  Completely  empty of  content  as  it  was,  that
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slogan was for this very reason all the more powerful. By avoiding all content, the regime
was showing that it is indeed the center, for only the center doesn’t need to name itself –
everyone knows it is where it should be (tamo gde treba), and that it is doing what should
be done (šta treba). In that sense, the Ministry of Culture’s slogan was just an extension of
the slogan Socialist Party used in the 1992 elections : « tako treba » – a deictic masterpiece
if there ever was one. Tako treba and could be translated as « this is how it should be », or
« as it should be », or « in this way », or simply as « Thus ! » Instead of a certain definable
goal or quality of action, the utterance brazenly proclaimed that the setting of goals or
the quality of action whatever they may be at any moment is dependent on the point of
view of the one actor whose identity everyone knew. The phrase also carried with it an
echo of a whole genre of expressions widespread in Communist regimes that named the
unutterable  center  of  power  with  precisely  such  shifters49.  The  slogan  immediately
became a part of everyday talk easily establishing the intertextual link with the already
familiar  usage  of  such  shifters  during  Tito’s  era :  « he  phoned  where  he  should »  (
telefonirao je tamo gde treba), « it was decided where it should » (odlučeno je tamo gde treba),
« he told whom he should » (rekao je kome treba), and so on. The slogan was a masterpiece
of cynicism. It took the whole inchoate experience of that period, with all its misery,
trauma and impoverishment and brazenly declared that even all that was As It Should Be.
In everyday usage the slogan was commonly given all kinds of ironic twists ranging from
« tako nam i treba » (it serves us right) – a rueful recognition of our own responsibility for
the miserable condition of our lives, to sardonic counter-slogans, such as those used in
the massive protests of the Winter 1996 which counter one by one all the slogans Socialist
Party of Serbia used in previous elections50 : « with us there’s no uncertainty – war » (sa
nama nema neizvesnosti – rat) ; « as it should be – sanctions » (tako treba – sankcije) ; « Serbia
will not bow down – Dayton » (Srbija se saginjati neće - Dejton) ; « Let's go on – The Hague » (
Idemo dalje – Hag). A popular song by the rock band Fish soup capitalized on the fact that
“bread” in genitive case (hleba) rhymes with “should” (treba) and produced these lines
that were echoed in many less successful versions :
48 Today, there’s no milk, today there’s no bread,
So eat shit – perhaps it “Should be That Way”
(Danas nema mleka, danas nema hleba,
zato jedi govna– možda tako treba)
49 All these ironic twists, however, only rebounded on the one who uttered them because no
matter how you twisted it, by the very act of uttering the slogan you were still forced to
acknowledge that you know very well who was behind it, who the real boss was – which
was precisely the effect that the slogan aimed at.
50 So with culture – the Center spoke the word and thus claimed the throne. If the Ministry
said what kind of a good thing culture was, it would have been open to argument. Instead,
the slogan pre-emptied all argument, debate and negation, for culture is simply whatever
is associated at any given moment with the throne – proximity to the throne is the only
criterion of value.
51 This latest appropriation, notwithstanding the apparent ease with which the Campaign
came to  be  ridiculed by  the  cultured opposition in  1995,  added yet  another  moral /
cognitive warp to an already benumbingly warped world of Serbia, and it made this latest
round of Jeremiads sound a tone of deeper, more desperate anguish than their illustrious
ancestors like Slobodan Jovanović, Bogdan Popović, or Vladimir Velmar-Janković some
sixty to eighty years ago. Even though they talked about the same phenomena, and used
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the same phrases, these ancestors belonged to a generation of Serbian intelligentsia that
essentially  was in  charge.  The Jeremiads of  1994 and 1995 were used and discarded,
marginalized  and  ridiculed,  co-opted  and  silenced,  and  then  finally  robbed  of  their
agendas and rhetorics by a chameleon regime wearing the face of Bidža and his likes one
day, and that of smiling Mesolithic figurine the other.
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specifically, the consciousness of the unity of all the Serbs in the former Yugoslavia.
19.  I use “bourgeois” here for the Serbian “gradjanski” (pedigre). Both terms exists in Serbian
and denote roughly the same thing but their connotations are very different. While buržujski has
acquired negative Marxist connotations, gradjanski retains more positive connotations of “civic”
or “civil”.
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20.  Djordje Balašević, a composer-singer from Novi Sad whose popularity makes him a “bard”
equivalent to say, Bulat Okudzhava in Russia. A line from one of his most popular songs (Ratnik
paorskog srca – A Warrior with the Peasant Heart) encapsulates the long standing Romanticization
of the Serbian peasant as hard-working and peaceful recently popularized in the novels of Danko
Popović and Dobrica Ćosić : « a peasant is not made out to be a soldier, he prefers horses and soil
to people ». Balašević is then certainly on Novaković’s side but Novaković here casts him as an
urbanite who resents “peasantrification” of cities. The contradiction probably disappears if we
assume that Balašević referred to peasant-urbanites, the folknjaks that he sociologically defined
as  a  « hybrid  class  half-way  from  village  to  city »  in  another  hugely  popular  song  of  his
(Narodnjaci –  Folknjaks). 
21.  The only mountain in otherwise completely flat Vojvodina region.
22.  Obvious allusion to the Communist allegiances of the highlander newcomers.
23.  Novaković  (Nikola  J),  « Premestanje  prema  rasporedu  svetlosti »  (Déplacement  vers
l’éclatement de la lumière), Naša Borba, 24/12/94.
24.  I owe this phrase to Professor Raymond Fogelson who suggested it as a logical fourth term in
the tripartite classification of types I initially proposed consisting of :  1) The (Šumadija) solid
peasant,  2)  the  cosmopolitan-urbanite,  and  3)  the  peasant-urbanite  halfling.  At  that  time,  I
couldn’t find an example of the peasant-cosmopolitan, but I have since realized that in addition
to  Novaković,  such  influential  writers  as  Danko  Popović  and  Dobrica  Ćosić  are  actually
attributing a peculiar kind of “cosmopolitanism” to their idealized peasant characters.
25. Fernandez  (James  W.),  Persuasions  and  Performances :  The  Play  of  Tropes  in  Culture,
Bloomington : Indiana University Press, 1986.
26. Gal (Susan),  art.cit. ;  Gal (Susan), Irvine (Judith T.),  « The boundaries of  languages and
diciplines : How ideologies construct difference », Social Research, 62 (4), 1995.
27. Džadžić (Petar), Homo balcanicus, homo heroicus, 2 vols, Beograd : Prosveta, 1994.
28.  A  prominent  cultural  figure  in  Belgrade,  Jerotić  gave  innumerable  well-attended  public
lectures on literature, psychology, philosophy, and lately theology, in the last twenty or so years.
Since  he  retired  from  clinical  practice,  he  teaches  pastoral  psychology  at  the  Belgrade
Theological Faculty.
29. Jovanović  (Slobodan),  « Srpski  nacionalni  karakter »  (Le  caractère  national  serbe),  in
Jovanović (B.), ur., Karakterologija Srba (Caractérologie des Serbes), Beograd : Naučna knjiga, 1992,
p. 230.
30. Greenfeld  (Liah),  Nationalism :  Five  Roads  to  Modernity,  Cambridge /  London :  Harvard
University Press, 1992.
31.  This happened when writer Svetislav Basara attacked Dobrica Ćosić, Vuk Karadžić and other
icons of Serbian cultural  identity of  the more populist  sort.  As Ivan Čolović  put it,  Basara is
against the aggressive Serbian nationalism because that nationalism is too folksy and vulgar.
« Serbian culture and politics, founded on folklore and folk myth making », Čolović summarizes
Basara’s argument, « should give way to a sacral order founded on the myth of the Medieval
Serbian elite,  the Slavic  being and Byzantine civilization.  In other words,  Basara is  rejecting
rightist populism in the name of rightist elitism ». « Those, who like Basara, are disappointed by
the return to the epic Kosovo », Čolović concludes his analysis, « are recommending a return to
Byzantium. Nobody, including Basara, suggests a return to the United Nations, but many, and he
is among them, rather expect that, as of tomorrow, Serbia will again gain membership in the
alternative international organization of the spiritually gigantic and spiritually kindred nations
called, as we all know, the Byzantine Commonwealth » (Čolović (Ivan), « Sozercanje », Naša Borba
, 1996). Kosovo, Byzantine Commonwealth and the United Nations are very good labels for the
three  analytically  distinguishable  orientations  or  responses  to  the  predicaments  of  adopting
foreign, Western models (for extended discussion see Zivkovic (Marko), « Inverted Perspective
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and Serbian Peasants : The Byzantine Revival in Serbia », Paper read at Negotiating Boundaries : The
Past in the Present in South-Eastern Europe, September 6-8, 1998, at Lampeter, Wales).
32. Elias (Norbert), The Civilizing Process : The History of Manners and State Formation and Civilization,
Oxford /  Cambridge :  Blackwell,  1994 ;  Elias  (Norbert),  The  Germans :  Power  Struggles  and  the
Development of Habitus in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, New York : Columbia University
Press, 1996 ; Greenfeld (Liah), op.cit.
33.  The  conference  was  organized  by  the  newly  formed  Democratic  Center,  a  non-party
organization led by Dragoljub Mićunović, and was held from 1-2 March of 1995, at the Belgrade
Student  Cultural  Center,  formerly  a  center  for  alternative  and avant-garde but  as  of  recent,
firmly under the regime control. The poster announcing the conference featured DeVinci’s Mona
Lisa with boxing gloves.
34.  Musical instruments of Turkish origin.
35. Bourdieu (Pierre), Distinction : A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste, Cambridge : Harvard
University Press, 1984, p. 7.
36. Ibid., p. 469.
37.  Thus Dragoljub Mićunović, the leader of the Democratic Center, in his opening speech at the
Conference,  claims that  our society,  because of  the indeterminacy and fuzziness  of  its  social
structure, presents a problem for social scientific understanding :
« The task of social sciences is not at all easy because our society, like the other similar societies,
does not lend itself easily to structural analysis. The social structure is illegally and illegitimately
formed and doesn’t lend itself to the usual criteria. The social strata were formed on the basis of
covert  privileges  and  corruption,  independently  from  the  social  position  and  status,
independently from education and the lifestyle. What then is the social structure like today –
when one becomes a millionaire or a pauper in a month ! With such turbulent and indeterminate
social  structure  the  ideological  and  political  spectrum  of  parties,  the  differentiation  and
permanence of their programs, and thus normal parliamentarism is made impossible ».
38.  « Those regions of ours » is the best translation I could come up with for the Serbian « na
(ovim) našim prostorima ». This is an extremely widespread way of referring to “our country”,
“here”,  etc.,  in a very loose way with accrued connotations of  instability of  borders,  general
ambiguity, and the long suffering sense of countless empires and armies which marched through
and devastated « these regions of ours ».
39.  The two uprisings against the Ottomans in 1804 and 1815 that led to autonomy and later
independence of Serbia, referred to (most notably by Ranke) as “Serbian Revolution”.
40.  Personal communication. Latinka Perović was a prominent member of the so-called “Serbian
Liberals” who were purged from the leadership of Serbian League of Communists in the early
1970’s  by  Tito.  After  being  ousted,  she  became  a  highly  respected  historian  of  socialist
movements in modern Serbia.
41.  Cerović (Stojan), « Beogradska južna pruga » (La ligne sud de Belgrade), Vreme, 1994. This is
where another important notion of what being cultured means could be found. According to that
notion, culture is independent of education, even opposed to it. After all, the culturedness of the
volk is the supposedly the opposite of the culture of the educated and as interpreted by some of
those  educated  actually  superior  to  it.  When Sapir  says  that  an  American  Indian has  better
chances at being genuinely cultured than a telephone girl, he is embracing a similar notion of
what being cultured means. An example could be found in a review of Momčilo Bošković’s book
Stranputice – patologija kuluture i karaktera ~oveka (Strayings : the Pathology of Culture and Human
Character) in Politka of March 30. In that case, the word is not culture but « to be spiritually
thought out » (biti  duhovno promišljen)  for which culture could probably be safely substituted.
Bošković  points out,  notes the reviewer, that even an academic « could remain a primitive »,
while an illiterate person could be a « spiritually thought out individual ... Maybe it is even the
case that the former is easier to accomplish ».
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42.  In literature and film this figure is predominantly presented as male in a plot that could be
called “reversed Pygmalion”. The male is the uncultivated, raw and brutal primitive, who is then
cultivated by the ethereal, fragile and cultivated girl from the urban elite (gradjanski sloj) The plot
usually takes place at one or another of those upheavals and catastrophes when the new wave of
highlanders, barbarians, etc., yet again floods the city and destroys the urban elite (see Zivkovic
(Marko), « Tender-hearted Criminals and the Reverse Pygmalion : Narratives of the Balkan Male
in Recent Serbian Films », Paper read at American Anthropological Association Meetings, December
2-6, 1998, at Philadelphia).
43. Velmar-Janković  (Vladimir),  Pogled  s  Kalemegdana :  Ogled  o  beogradskom  čoveku (Vue  de
Kalamegdan : regard sur l’homme belgradois), Beograd : Biblioteka grada Beograda, 1992.
44. Konstantinović (Radomir), Filosofija palanke (Small Town Philosophy), Beograd : Nolit, 1991
(2nd ed.).
45.  Konstantinović  sees the spirit of Palanka, underlying the whole of Serbian mentality and
culture, as a spirit of « a tribe in agony ». No longer “a tribe” with its a-historical mentality, but a
spirit  (to  use  Konstantinović’s  cumbersome  philosophical  jargon  of  some  sort  of  German
provenance)  already  “infected”  with  history,  already  “conscious”  of  tribe  as  tribe,  thus
irreparably  distanced  from  it,  the  Palanka  is  a  « consciousness  rebelling  against  itself,  a
consciousness of particularity (individuality) which, on its way towards the freely-open world of
the world spirit, as a spirit of infinite possibilities, a spirit of the stylistic multivocality, got stuck,
which  did  not  go  over  from  the  particularity  (or  individualism)  to  the  attitude  of  creative
subjectivity, but it is a consciousness which, precisely for that reason, seeks self-cancellation of
its own self as cancellation of its own particularity, as a consciousness of the tribe in agony, a
tribe which has taken leave of itself and tries to come back » (Konstantinović (Radomir), op.cit.,
pp. 18-19). This rather unintelligibly written book is one of the most powerful statements, or
rather indictments of the national character and its half-bakedness. Much of the lamentation on
all kinds of semi- and half- and in-between phenomena, from the peasant urbanite halfling, to
the  semi-intellectuals  Jovanović  talks  about,  could  be  seen  as  having  their  philosophical
foundation, or exegesis in the Philosophy of Palanka.
46.  Cited by Glišić (Milivoje), « Lepota života » (La beauté de la vie), NIN, 24/03/95.
47. Ibid.
48.  I discuss the so-called theories of « Serbs as the Most Ancient People » in Zivkovic (Marko),
« Inverted Perspective » (art.cit.).
49.  A  passage from Vladimir  Voinovich’s  The  Life  and  Extraordinary  Adventures  of  Private  Ivan
Chonkin, gives a brilliant example. The translation was done by Dale Pesmen who tried to make
the untranslatable wordplay understandable in English. Unlike English, the Serbian translation
retains the same wordplay that exists in the original Russian.
« To readers from distant galaxies, unfamiliar with our earthly customs, a legitimate question
might occur – what does the Place Where You Belong mean ? Where You Belong for whom and
for what ? In this connection, the author offers the following explanation : in the bygone times
described by the author, there existed everywhere a certain Institution, which was not so much
military as  militant  ...  This  Institution acquired the reputation of  seeing everything,  hearing
everything, knowing everything, and, if something was out of line, the Institution would be there
in a flash.  For this  reason people would say,  if  you are too smart,  you’ll  end up Where You
Belong ;  if  you blab too much you’ll  end up Where You Belong ...  One person blabs What he
Should, and another, What he Shouldn’t. If you blab What you Should, you’ll have everything you
Should and even a little more. If you blab what you Shouldn’t, you’ll end up Where You Belong,
that is, in the above mentioned Institution. »
50.  Naša Borba, 25/11/96, Internet edition.
Too Much Character, Too Little Kultur : Serbian Jeremiads 1994-1995
Balkanologie, Vol. II, n° 2 | 1998
18
ABSTRACTS
In that period, Serbian Jeremiads seemed to reach their “purest” form and became a ubiquitous,
if not a dominant genre of social commentary that ranged from everyday talk to discourses of
social scientists. Moreover, it is during that period that the Milošević regime makes a 180 degree
turn that appropriates, preempts and « colonizes » the rhetorics and initiatives of the opposition
Jeremiads by “simulating” their cultural criticism. Moreover, the talk about national character
started to focus increasingly on the flip-side of the heroic Dinaric type. Thus Serbian Jeremiads of
1994-1995 can offer a valuable insight into the social tensions and political agendas struggling for
supremacy in Milošević’s Serbia.
The Jeremiads of 1994 and 1995 were used and discarded, marginalized and ridiculed, co-opted
and silenced, and then finally robbed of agendas and rhetorics of the old generation of Serbian
intelligentsia by a chameleon regime.
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